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Abstract
Many verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies
to contracts among family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions,
and sovereign debt contracts. Do such non-enforceable contracts matter? We use
a version of the trust game with participants from Norway and Tanzania to study
repayment decisions in the presence of non-enforceable loan contracts. Our main
finding is that the specific content of the contract has no effect on loan repayment.
Rather, the borrowers seem to be motivated by other moral motives, which con-
tributes to explaining why they partly fulfill non-enforceable contracts. We also
show that some borrowers violate the axiom of first order stochastic dominance
when rejecting loan offers, which partly may reflect negative reciprocity, but also
seems to reflect a fundamental aversion against uncertainty.
1 Introduction
Contracts are often difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family and
friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. It may
be prohibitively difficult for a family member to enforce a loan contract with another
family member, or for an employer to have some types of labor contracts enforced.
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To illustrate the latter, consider the case where an employee has committed herself
to work for a company for a certain period of time, but then is offered a better op-
portunity in a different company. In such a case, it may not be beneficial for the
employer to insist that the employee sticks to the terms of the contract. Similarly, it
may sometimes be very hard for companies to enforce contracts with suppliers located
in other countries, since it may be extremely costly to take the case to court. Sovereign
debt contracts are the quintessential example of non-enforceable contracts, as there
are no courts at all with the power to make recalcitrant borrowers honor their obliga-
tions (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Tomz and Wright, 2007;
Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009).1
What is then the role of non-enforceable contracts? The classical view in eco-
nomics is that non-enforceable contracts are nothing but cheap talk. If everyone un-
derstands that the contract is non-enforceable, then it plays no role in determining the
actions of the contracting partners. The contract may still, of course, be fulfilled, for
example due to reputation considerations, but the contracting partners will always re-
nege on the contract if it is in their self-interest to do so. The recent literature on
social preferences, however, has convincingly shown that people are not only self-
ishly concerned, but also motivated by moral considerations (Camerer, 2003; Konow,
2003). This may have important implications for our understanding of the role of non-
enforceable contracts. It may be that people consider it a moral duty in itself to fulfill
a contract, even when it is non-enforceable. The contract may serve as a reference
point and create moral entitlements (Hart and More, 2008; Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder,
2009, 2011a,b), and thus the non-enforceable contract may turn out to be crucial in
determining the actions of the contracting partners. But it is not obvious that morally
motivated people assign such a role to the contract. Possibly, they may rather focus on
other moral arguments considered relevant when there is a conflict of interest, which
may overturn any concern they have for fulfilling the contract obligations.
In order to study the role of non-enforceable contracts in a setting where other
moral motives also enter the picture, we conducted a version of the trust game with
participants from Norway and Tanzania.2 The matching of participants from one of
the richest and one of the poorest countries in the world made needs considerations
a salient feature of the situation. Furthermore, we introduced a random shock in the
second part of the trust game, which implied that fairness considerations related to this
shock also could potentially affect the participants’ behavior.
1Verifiability is another important challenge when designing contracts, but even verifiable contracts
may be hard to enforce. This is most easily seen in the case of sovereign debt loan contracts, where
the payment schedule is clearly specified and beyond dispute. If the loan obligation is not fulfilled by
the borrowing country, then it impossible to use legal means to force a country to repay its debt. This
insight applies more generally, there are clearly many market and non-market situations where verifiable
contracts are impossible or hard to enforce.
2For other studies introducing a contract in the trust game, see Malhotra and Murnighan (2002);
Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009); Rigdon (2009). See also Irlenbusch (2006) for an early experimental
analysis of how social norms may affect behavior in transactions governed by non-binding contracts.
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In the experiment, some participants were asked to determine how much money
they wanted to lend to another participant on the basis of information about the na-
tionality of the borrower and the contract type. The contract was either a fixed inter-
est contract or a surplus sharing contract. If the other participant accepted the loan
contract, the money was automatically invested in an uncertain project which had an
expected return that was twice the expected interest on the loan amount specified in
the loan contract. When the outcome of the investment was realized the borrower
was free to determine how much he wanted to repay, that is, the loan contract was
non-enforceable.
Our main finding is that non-enforceable loan contracts do not appear to play an
important role in explaining repayment behavior. In particular, repayment behavior
does not depend on contract type. Rather, other moral motives seem to be more salient
for the borrowers, including reciprocity, fairness, and needs considerations. Still, we
cannot rule out, given our design, that the presence of a contract played some role
for the participants, even though the specific contract type did not matter. In our set-
ting, the contract may partly have strengthened the reciprocal motive and weakened
needs considerations. We also show that some borrowers reject the offer of a non-
enforceable loan contract, which suggests that non-selfish considerations matter for
the participants. In some cases, rejecting the loan contract represents a violation of the
axiom of first order stochastic dominance, and we provide evidence suggesting that
this partly reflects a fundamental aversion against uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample and the experi-
mental. Section 3 analyzes the lenders’ decisions about how much of their endowment
to offer as a loan, and the borrowers’ decisions about whether or not to accept the loan
and honor the non-enforceable contract. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Design
In this section, we start by providing an overview of the main features of the experi-
ment, before we move to a more detailed discussion of the sample and design.
2.1 Main features
We conducted a version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) with
participants located in Norway and Tanzania. At the beginning of the experiment, all
participants were given a complete description of how the experiment would proceed.
At both locations, as part of the introduction, a research assistant took an overview pic-
ture of the lab and immediately uploaded it to an Internet site. The pictures from both
locations were then shown to all participants on their computers after the introduction
was completed. We did this to familiarize the participants with the idea that they were
taking part in an international experiment where they would interact with participants
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in another country.3
All interaction between the participants was anonymous and conducted through a
web-based interface. English was the language of communication in both countries. It
is an official language in Tanzania and Norwegian students are also fluent in English.
The show up fees were calibrated to reflect local costs, but all participants faced the
same incentives in the experiment. The average payment from the experiment was 81
USD for the participants in Norway and 68 USD for the participants in Tanzania.
The main feature of the design was that the participants, who were randomly as-
signed to be either a lender or a borrower, could agree on a non-enforceable loan
contract. The money borrowed was automatically invested in an uncertain investment
project with an expected gain equal to twice the amount invested. The lenders offered
loans in four types of situations, which only differed with respect to whom they were
paired with and the type of loan contract they could offer: a fixed repayment contract
or a surplus sharing contract. When the outcome of the investment was realized, the
borrower was free to determine how much he wanted to repay, that is, the loan contract
was non-enforceable.
When all borrowers had made their repayment decisions, the computer randomly
and with equal probability selected one of the situations that each of the participants
had been involved in as the one that determining the outcome for them. The final
payment from the experiment was the amount they received in the selected situation
plus the show-up fee.
At the end of the experiment, each participant was assigned a payment code on their
screen, which they were asked to write down on a payment form that was in a folder
next to their computer. After the experiment was completed, the computer generated
a list of the payment codes together with the corresponding amounts earned in the
experiment for research assistants that were not present in the lab. On the basis of this
list, the assistants prepared envelopes containing the payments. When the assistants
had prepared all the envelopes, they put them in a box and transferred them to the
lab. They immediately left the lab so that no one in the lab knew how much money
each of the envelopes contained. The envelopes were then given to the participants in
accordance with the payment code they had been assigned. The payment procedure
was designed to ensure that no one in the lab, not even members of the research group,
would know how much each participant earned from the experiment.
2.2 Sample
A total of 128 participants from the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and 113
participants from the University of Bergen, Norway participated in six sessions run
simultaneously in the two countries. The participants were recruited among the social
3The pictures also ensured that the participants believed that there were actual recipients in the other
lab, but they did not reveal any information beyond what can be observed by a participant when entering
a lab.
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science students at the two universities. The average age of the participants was 23.1
years in Norway and 24.2 years in Tanzania. The gender composition was balanced
in both countries, the share of males was 47.2% in Norway and 50.9% in Tanzania.
All participants in Tanzanian were Tanzanians, but we cannot rule out that some of the
participants in the Norwegian lab were non-Norwegians. Still, for short, we will refer
to the nationality of the participants as uniquely determined by their location.
In the analysis, we assume that the participants in both countries consider the Tan-
zanian participants, on average, more needy than the Norwegian participants. This
should be a rather uncontroversial assumption to make. Aggregate statistics show huge
income gaps between these countries, where real GDP per capita is 47 times higher in
Norway than in Tanzania (Table 6, International Comparison Program, 2008). This
difference is also reflected in the average standard of living for students in the respec-
tive countries. To illustrate, the average disposable income (including transfers) of
regular full-time students not living with parents was 16600 USD per year in Nor-
way;4 in contrast, there have been rioting and strikes over undisbursed student loans
and stipends intended to help the students pay for books and meals at the University of
Dar es Salaam and Makerere University. The typical self-assessment among students
in the African countries has been that “the majority of us come from poor families”
. . . “our parents have already sold pieces of land, herds of cattle . . . to pay . . . tuition
fees” (East Africa in Focus, September 22, 2009). This situation has also been recog-
nized by the donor community, and the University of Dar es Salaam receives support
from international donors, including donors from Norway.
The long-term outlooks are also very different for the two groups of students. Al-
Samarrai and Bennell (2007) report that university graduates with some years of ex-
perience in Tanzania had an average monthly income of 275 USD, and they point out
that “[m]any university graduates were part-time entrepreneurs generating secondary
income that is essential for their household survival, but these part-time activities were
invariably limited in scale and sophistication ”(p. 31). Thus, it should be rather uncon-
troversial to assume that, on average, the participants from Tanzania are more needy
than the participants from Norway. When interpreting the results, however, we should
keep in mind that some participants may focus on the relative, not absolute, living
standard of students in their country, which may weaken the perception of the African
students as more needy than the European students.5
2.3 Lending
At the beginning of the experiment each participant was given an endowment of 50
US dollars, and then randomly and with equal probability assigned the role as lender
or borrower. Lenders were asked how much of the endowment they wanted to lend to
4In local currency, the numbers are 112 000 NOK per year in Norway (Table 4, Løwe and Sæther,
2007)
5See also Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen, and Tungodden (forthcoming).
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another participant, where the choice set was 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 USD. They made
choices in four one-shot situations, where in each situation they were paired with a
different participant.6 Since only one of the situations would be realized, the lenders
could lend the entire endowment or less in each situation.
Before making a choice, the lender was given information about the potential bor-
rower’s nationality and the type of debt contract he could offer. In two situations he
could offer a fixed interest rate contract, which specified that the borrower should re-
pay the loan amount plus a fixed interest of 50%. The contract repayment amount was
thus independent of the outcome from the uncertain investment. In two other situations
the lenders could offer a surplus sharing contract, which specified that the borrowers
should repay the loan amount plus 50% of the return on the investment. If the surplus
sharing contract was honored, the expected return to the lender would be the same as
if the fixed interest rate contract was honored, but the lender would be entitled to less
with the surplus sharing contract if the investment was a failure and more if it was
successful.
For each contract type, the lenders were paired once with a borrower from the same
country and once with a borrower from the other country.
2.4 Borrowing and repayment
Participants who were assigned the role as borrowers were asked to accept or reject
loan offers in up to four situations. Each offer consisted of a loan amount and a loan
contract. Before they made a decision on whether to accept the loan offer, they were
also informed of the nationality of the lender. If they accepted the offer, the loan was
automatically invested in an uncertain project. The return on the investment was, with
equal probability, 0, 100% or 200%, thus the expected return was 100%.
The fixed interest rate contracts specified a repayment of 150% of the loan amount.
Thus, if the investment failed, the borrowers had to cover the interest from their own
endowment if they were to honor the contract. In the two other possible investment
outcomes, the return on the investment would more than cover the interest rate and
the borrowers would earn a net surplus from the investment even if they honored the
contract. The expected gain from accepting and honoring a fixed loan contract would
be 50%.
The surplus sharing contracts specified a repayment that depended on the outcome
of the investment. If the investment failed, there would be no interest, and the contract
would specify that the borrower only should pay back the loan amount. If the return
on the investment was 100%, the borrower had to a 50% interest rate, the same as
with fixed interest, to honor the surplus sharing contract; if the return was 200%, the
interest rate would be 100%. The expected gain from accepting and honoring a surplus
sharing contract would be the same as with a fixed interest contract, 50%, but it is less
6To accommodate differences in session size, a few participants only made decisions in three situa-
tions.
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risky than a fixed interest contract. In fact, accepting and honoring a surplus sharing
contract first order stochastically dominates not accepting it (in monetary terms).
When the computer had determined the investment outcome, the borrower had to
decide how much to repay the lender. The choice set was discrete, so repayment had
to be done in units of 5 USD. Before making a decision, the borrower was reminded
of the nationality of the lender and the terms of the loan contract. They were also
reminded that they were free to decide how much they wanted to repay since the loan
contract could not be enforced.
3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the data from the three types of decisions made in the
experiment; the lender’s decision of how much to offer in loan, the borrower’s decision
of whether to accept or reject the loan offer, and the borrower’s decision of how much
to repay.
3.1 Loan offers
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 472 loan offers by country. We observe that the
lenders offer less than the full endowment, which is not surprising given that the loan
contract is non-enforceable. Still, the large majority of the lenders offered positive
amounts (93.4%), where the average loan offer was 29.7 USD out of an endowment
of 50 USD. The distribution of loan offers is more compressed in Tanzania than Nor-
way, where fewer Tanzanians offer nothing and everything, but the average offer is
strikingly similar in the two countries.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In Table 1, we break down the loan offers by the nationality of the borrower and
loan contract. Interestingly, we observe that the nationality of the borrower does not
matter for the lenders, which is consistent with needs considerations not being salient
in the lending decision. Furthermore, we observe that lenders do not differentiate be-
tween contract type, which provides initial evidence for the non-enforceable contract
itself not being a crucial motive in the present context. The fact that lenders offer
positive loan amounts is a strong indication of them expecting borrowers not to act
completely selfishly, but rather being motivated by moral considerations. The lack of
differentiation in loan amount across contract type, however, suggests that the lenders
expect other moral motives than honoring the contract itself to be crucial when bor-
rowers are to decide how much to return.
[Table 1 about here.]
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3.2 Accepting or rejecting
A majority of the loan offers were accepted by the borrower, but a substantial fraction,
close to 30%, were rejected. The Norwegians rejected 20.3% and the Tanzanians
rejected 38.9% of the loan offers. The high rejection rate is striking, since the expected
return for the borrower from accepting and honoring the loan contract is 50 percent.
What explains the high rejection rate? With a fixed interest rate contract, risk
aversion provides a possible explanation. If the uncertain investment fails, a borrower
would have to spend some of her own endowment to honor the contract. As shown in
Table 2, however, the rejection rate does not depend on contract type, it is equally high
for the surplus sharing contract. This is a striking finding, since a borrower cannot
lose money on a surplus sharing contract. Accepting a surplus sharing contract first
order stochastically dominates rejecting it, even for a borrower who intends to honor
the contract. If the investment fails, there is no interest on the loan, and the borrower
is equally well off as if she had rejected the contract. If there is a positive return on
the investment, on the other hand, the borrower receives a substantial net surplus from
accepting the contract.
[Table 2 about here.]
Negative reciprocity provides one possible reason for rejecting the loan offer, even
with a surplus sharing contract. It is well established that people are willing to sacri-
fice own monetary payoff to punish unkind behavior (Fehr, Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger,
1997; Charness, 2004), and in the present experiment borrowers may have become of-
fended by small loan offers. They may have interpreted a small loan offer as a signal
of the lender not considering them trustworthy, and as a consequence they may have
decided to punish the lender for not having trust in them.7 To study this explanation
more closely, we consider the distribution of acceptance rate across loan offers, as
shown in Figure 2. In Tanzania, we observe that the acceptance rate is much lower for
the smallest loan offers than for the largest loan offers, 41.7% versus 80.0%, which
lends support to Tanzanian borrowers being motivated by negative reciprocity when
rejecting small loan offers. We find a similar, but less pronounced, relationship for
Norwegian borrowers.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Still, both in Tanzania and Norway, we observe that about 20% of the loan offers
representing the full endowment are rejected, which certainly cannot be explained by
7An alternative strategy could of course be to accept the loan offer, but then punish the lender in
the repayment phase. It is not obvious, however, that morally motivated individuals would find it ap-
propriate to exploit an unkind act to their own advantage, even though it would have been a less costly
punishment strategy in monetary terms. Second, the rejection of unkind loan offers may also reflect an
emotional response, which did not involve strategic considerations of what would be the most appropri-
ate punishment strategy.
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negative reciprocity. If we only consider the surplus sharing contracts, where we also
can rule out risk aversion as an explanation, we find that 12.5% and 20.7% of the loan
offers of 50 USD were rejected in Norway and Tanzania, respectively. We suggest that
this reflects that some borrowers have a fundamental aversion to uncertainty. The un-
certainty effect was first demonstrated by Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006), who showed,
both in field and lab experiments, that there are choice situations in which individuals
value a risky prospect less than its worst possible realization. This is exactly what hap-
pens when borrowers reject a surplus sharing contract, and our data are thus consistent
with the uncertainty effect influencing a non-negligible share of the borrowers.
3.3 Repayment
Did the borrowers honor the non-enforceable loan contract? The lower panel in Fig-
ure 3 shows that a significant share of them did, 36.4% and 21.9% of the participants
in Norway and Tanzania returned at least the contract amount to the lender. We also
observe from the upper panel that a majority of the participants returned at least the
loan amount, both in Norway and Tanzania. Since the experiment was a one-shot
game without any strategic reasons for repaying, this provides clear evidence of moral
motivation among the borrowers both in Norway and Tanzania.
It is particularly striking to observe that only a very small share of the participants
fully exploited the non-enforceable nature of the contract and returned nothing to the
lender. This happened in 19% of the situations in Norway and only in 2.9% of the
situations in Tanzania. The high level of repayment in Tanzania clearly demonstrates
that it is a mistake to think of moral motivation as a luxury good that only the rich
can afford. Even in the presence of very high stakes and a non-enforceable contract,
almost all Tanzanians decided to return a significant amount to the lenders. On av-
erage, the borrowers returned 91.3% and 88.4% of the loan amount in Norway and
Tanzania, where we observe that the distribution of repaid amount is more compressed
in Tanzania than in Norway.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The fact that many borrowers returned a substantial amount is not very informative
of the motivational role played by the contract. To better understand whether the non-
enforceable contract motivated repayment, we need to study whether contract type
mattered for repayment behavior. In this respect, it is important to keep in mind that
since lenders did not differentiate between contract type when deciding how much to
offer in loan, as shown in Table 1, and borrowers did not differentiate between contract
type when deciding whether to accept or reject the contract, as shown in Table 2, the
borrowers faced on average the same contract amount and the same kind of situation
under the two contract types when deciding how much to repay. Thus, both honoring
the contract and being motivated by some other moral considerations would imply that
the average amount returned should be the same under the two contract types. This is
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consistent with what we observe in Table 3. Even though the share repaid is higher
under a surplus sharing contract, the difference is not statistically significant (p= 0.43,
Norway; p= 0.44, Tanzania).
[Table 3 about here.]
If the contract itself motivated repayment, however, we should expect the contract
type to matter for how much the borrowers repaid under different outcomes of the
uncertain investment. The essential feature of the surplus sharing contract was that
the contract amount should depend on the investment outcome, whereas the borrowers
always faced the same contract amount under the fixed interest rate contract. In Ta-
ble 3, we report regressions for Norway and Tanzania that test whether this difference
mattered for the borrowers. We introduce the variable surplus that measures the net
return from the investment, and then we interact it with the contract type. The surplus
itself may matter for fairness reasons, since borrowers may consider it fair to share
such a surplus with the lender.8 The interaction term between the surplus variable and
the fixed interest rate contract, however, would capture if sharing of the surplus was
motivated by what is specified in the contract. We therefore consider the significance
of this interaction to capture whether the contract itself motivated repayment.
We also include in the regression variables that capture other moral considerations
potentially motivating the borrower. There is considerable evidence that people are
motivated by reciprocal preferences and are willing to reward kind actions even at
a cost to themselves (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Falk and Fischbacker, 2006), and the
size of the loan offer, included in the regression, may clearly be seen as a measure
of the kindness of the lender’s action.9 Second, as shown by Eckel and Grossman
(1996); Cappelen et al. (forthcoming), needs considerations may also be a powerful
moral motive in many distributive situations. In the present experiment, the borrower
was reminded of the nationality of the lender before deciding how much to return, and
she might consider it morally imperative to return more to the needy lenders in Tanza-
nia. We capture the needs motive in the regression by the indicator variable showing
whether the lender was from Tanzania or not. Finally, we include the background
variables age and sex for the borrowers.
[Table 4 about here.]
We observe from the interaction term that both Norwegian and Tanzanian borrow-
ers share less of the investment surplus with the lenders under a fixed interest contract,
but this difference is not statistically significant for any of the countries. We take
8This may reflect that borrowers find it fair to eliminate inequalities between themselves and the
lender that reflect factors beyond their control, see also Konow (2000); Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and
Kurki (2004); Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007); Cappelen, Sørensen, and
Tungodden (2010b); Cappelen et al. (forthcoming).
9Reciprocal behavior may also reflect a concern for equality, see Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov
(2006); Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007); Cappelen, Nygaard, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010a).
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this as evidence for the contract itself not motivating repayment behavior. We do,
however, observe that the other moral motives play an important role in explaining
repayment behavior. The reciprocal variable is highly significant for both countries
(p < 0.01), even though the point estimate is much higher for Norwegian borrowers.
Interestingly, we observe that the needs motive is only significant for Norwegian bor-
rowers (p = 0.068, Norway; p = 0.593, Tanzania). The fairness motive appears most
prominently for the Tanzanian borrowers, where the surplus variable is statistically
significant both under the surplus sharing contract (p < 0.01) and fixed interest con-
tract (p = 0.097); for Norwegian borrowers, the surplus variable is only statistically
significant under the surplus sharing contract (p < 0.01).
Even though we do not find evidence for contract type playing a role in explaining
repayment behavior, we cannot rule out that the presence of a contract in itself may
have affected the borrowers. The contract may have strengthened the reciprocal mo-
tive, since responding positively to a large loan amount also contributes to honor the
contract. Still, our point estimates for the Norwegian borrowers is very close to what is
typically observed in a trust game without non-enforceable contracts (Camerer, 2003),
and the point estimate for the Tanzanian borrowers is much lower, and thus we doubt
that the contact has had a significant effect on the importance assigned to the recip-
rocal motive. The contract may, however, also have affected the importance assigned
to needs considerations, and in this respect it is interesting to compare our results to
Cappelen et al. (forthcoming), who study a distributive situation involving Norwegian
and Tanzanian students without any non-enforceable contract. Whereas they find that
Norwegian students assign less importance to needs considerations than Tanzanian
students, which is consistent with a self-serving bias in moral motivation, we find the
opposite result where Norwegian borrowers assign more importance to needs. In fact,
there is no evidence of needs considerations affecting repayment behavior for Tan-
zanian borrowers, which may reflect that the presence of a non-enforceable contract
crowded out the needs motive for this group.
4 Concluding remarks
Non-enforceable contracts are common in all societies, but their role is still poorly
understood. Are such contracts more than cheap talk, and if so, why? We have reported
from an experiment suggesting that even though a significant share of the participants
honored (at least partly) the non-enforceable contract, the contract itself was not crucial
in explaining their behavior. The participants rather seemed to have focussed on other
relevant moral considerations, such as reciprocity, fairness, and needs.
We do, however, find some suggestive evidence of the presence of the contract
affecting the importance assigned to the different moral considerations. In particular,
we find that the Tanzanian participants did not pay attention to needs considerations,
which may reflect that they did not find such considerations relevant in the presence
of a contract. Our study thus points at two different ways that non-enforceable con-
11
tracts may change the behavior of morally motivated individuals; they may represent
an independent moral consideration, but may also influence the role played by other
morally relevant arguments.
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Note: The histograms show the fraction of lenders offering each of the six possible
loan amounts, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 USD, by the nationality of the lender.
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Note: The histograms show the average acceptance rates for each of the six possible
loan amounts offered, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 USD, by the nationality of the borrower.
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panel) and of contract amount (lower panel), by the nationality of the borrower.
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Table 1: Loan offers
Country of borrower Contract type
Country of lender Norway Tanzania Fixed interest Surplus sharing All
Norway 28.81 30.60 28.30 31.02 29.70
(2.01) (2.07) (2.14) (2.01) (1.98)
n 118 116 117 117 234
Tanzania 28.73 30.50 28.99 30.25 29.62
(1.70) (1.56) (1.68) (1.56) (1.46)
n 118 120 119 119 238
Note: Average loan offers in USD, by country of lender, country of borrower, and con-
tract type. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on individuals,
n is the number of observations in a cell.
Table 2: Acceptance of loan offers
Country of lender Contract type
Country of borrower Norway Tanzania Fixed interest Surplus sharing All
Norway 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.80
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
n 104 113 108 109 217
Tanzania 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.61
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
n 105 119 112 112 224
Note: Average acceptance rates of all loan offers, by country of borrower, country of
lender, and contract type. Loan offers of 0 USD were never presented for the borrower,
and thus are not included in the statistics. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for clustering on individuals, n is the number of observations in a cell.
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Table 3: Share repaid of loan amount
Country of lender Contract type
Country of borrower Norway Tanzania Fixed interest Surplus sharing All
Norway 0.838 0.987 0.888 0.938 0.913
(0.083) (0.083) (0.079) (0.078) (0.073)
n 86 87 87 86 173
Tanzania 0.916 0.857 0.848 0.922 0.884
(0.096) (0.076) (0.080) (0.092) (0.072)
n 61 76 71 66 137
Note: Average share repaid of loan amount by country of borrower, country of lender,
and contract type. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on
individuals, n is the number of observations in a cell.
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Table 4: Regression of repaid amount
Norway Tanzania
Loan amount 0.99∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.11)




Surplus × fixed interest rate contract -0.13 -0.055
(0.15) (0.15)
Lender from Tanzania 5.68 -1.43
(3.05) (2.66)








Note: Regression of repaid amount in USD, by the nationality of the borrower. “Loan
amount” is loan amount in USD; “Fixed interest contract” is an indicator variable
taking the value 1 if the borrower has accepted a fixed interest contract and the value 0
if the borrower has accepted a surplus sharing contract; “Surplus” is the return on the
investment in USD; “Lender from Tanzania” is an indicator variable taking the value 1
if the lender is from Tanzania and the value 0 if the lender is from Norway; “Borrower
is female” is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the borrower is a female and the
value 0 if the borrower is a male; “Age” is the age of the borrower, measured in years.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering on individuals, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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